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MERIT AND DIVERSITY: THE ORIGINS OF THE LAW SCHOOL 
ADMISSIONS TEST 
 
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses the creation of the Law School Admissions Test 
(LSAT) and is based on surviving archival materials.1  This story is 
particularly important today, fifty-five years after the first administration of the 
LSAT, because the use of an individual’s LSAT score in law school admission 
is in some ways at the heart of the controversy regarding affirmative action in 
law school admissions, a role upon which the United States Supreme Court has 
recently ruled.  In Grutter v. Bollinger, a divided Court found that the 
University of Michigan’s admission policies, which were carefully tailored to 
take race into account as an element of diversity, did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.2  In short, the so-called objective measures—grade point 
average and the LSAT score—need not be the only criteria by which 
applicants are judged.  In the Court’s view, the LSAT plays an important, 
though limited, role.  It remains a useful law school admissions tool. 
One thesis of this Article is that the LSAT was created to be a tool and that 
it was not intended to be the sole criterion for making admission decisions, an 
assertion strongly supported by the historical record.  A second thesis is 
inferred from the record by placing it in context.  Given the circumstances 
facing American law schools after the second World War, the creation of an 
“objective” test as an aspect of law school admissions increased access to legal 
education.  Finally, this Article argues that it is reasonable to conclude that this 
expansion of access was the aim of at least some of the legal academics 
involved in the creation of the test. 
 
* Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts and Estates, New York Law School. 
 1. These materials form the records of both the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) 
and of the Educational Testing Service (ETS).  The author was given access to them by the 
LSAC, which has in its possession the relevant ETS records on microfiche.  The interpretations 
and conclusions in this Article are those of the author alone and are not in any sense the official 
view of the LSAC or of ETS. 
 2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003). 
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A thorough investigation of how the test, and indeed other “objective” 
measures, came to be regarded as the sole measure of whether an applicant is 
worthy of admission is beyond the scope of this Article, but the conclusions 
presented lead to some suggestions for investigation of that question. 
II.  HISTORY OF ADMISSIONS TESTING 
The first step in understanding the hopes and plans of the creators of the 
LSAT is understanding the history of admissions testing before the second 
World War.  Two tests were well-known and used.  In the mid-1920s, George 
D. Stoddard, a psychologist at the University of Iowa, and Merton L. Ferson, 
dean at North Carolina and then at Cincinnati, collaborated on a test published 
by West.3  Starting in 1930, Yale Law School used a test developed by the 
university’s Department of Personnel Study.4  Both of these tests were 
consciously and explicitly designed to supplement other criteria, and especially 
to provide some control on the wide variation in the meaning of college 
records.  As one of the principal participants in the Yale effort put it, the 
purpose was “[t]o provide some check upon the validity of undergraduate 
records and to furnish a common denominator of educative promise.”5  Fifteen 
years earlier, Dean Ferson made the same points, and also emphasized the 
possibility of using such a test as a tool for counseling prospective students.6 
All those who discussed these tests in print, however, acknowledged that 
they were not, and neither could nor should be, the sole criteria by which 
admissions decisions were made.  As Henry Witham of the University of 
Tennessee stated in reporting his school’s experience with the Stoddard-Ferson 
test: “[T]he tests discover inherent mental ability (as applied to law), but do not 
show the will to work nor the capacity for work.”7  According to Witham, the 
test’s usefulness came in its ability to predict lack of success—students who 
did poorly on the aptitude test usually did poorly in law school.8  The 
predictive value of the test, he added, was enhanced when it was combined 
with a judgment about the applicant’s desire and ability to work.9  He 
explained those criteria: 
Desire to work is self-explanatory.  Under ability to work are included health 
and prior education, work outside of law school such as newspaper work, 
college annual, college sports, etc., social activities, and any number of outside 
 
 3. See Merton L. Ferson, Law Aptitude Examinations, 5 AM. L. SCH. REV. 563, 564 (1925). 
 4. See Albert B. Crawford & Tom Jay Gorham, The Yale Legal Aptitude Test, 49 YALE L.J. 
1237, 1238 (1940).  For a complete discussion of the Yale test, see id. at 1237-49. 
 5. Id. at 1238. 
 6. Ferson, supra note 3, at 563-65. 
 7. Henry B. Witham, Correspondence, Legal Aptitude Tests, 25 ILL. L. REV. 448, 449 
(1931). 
 8. Id. at 450. 
 9. Id. 
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distractions which might claim the student’s time and thought.  A student has 
ability to work in direct proportion to perfect health and prior education and in 
inverse proportion to his interest in outside distractions.10 
At Yale, according to the dean, the school’s own aptitude test formed part 
of the second stage of a two-step admissions process.11  Applicants who 
survived screening based on a written application, “which required the 
applicant to disclose most of his life history, good or bad,” college grades, and 
two letters of recommendation were invited to take the test and have an 
interview with a member of the admissions committee.12  While exact 
processes varied, it seems that schools that did use aptitude tests adamantly 
maintained that the resulting scores were but a part of the admissions decision.  
To an important degree, judgments were made on a subjective judgment of 
capacity and willingness to work. 
Whatever role subjective judgments played in admission decisions, 
discussions of testing also revealed a strong underlying belief in the existence 
of “aptitude” and the ability to measure it.  The Stoddard-Ferson and Yale tests 
resembled each other.  Both made use of various tests of verbal skills, as 
represented by questions dealing with synonyms and antonyms, verbal 
analogies, reading comprehension and recall, and some sort of test designed to 
be specifically “legal.”13  The Stoddard-Ferson effort even included a test of 
reading comprehension based on an excerpt from Langdell’s Summary of 
Contracts (which Dean Ferson, at least at one time, thought might be too 
difficult).14  At the University of Wisconsin, a study of various predictive 
measures found that the Yale test had no advantage over a standard 
intelligence test,15 which, according to one of the Wisconsin researchers, it 
resembled.16  The point, of course, is that the “legal” tests were based on the 
sort of intelligence tests developed in preceding decades and widely used for 
the first time to test Army recruits during the first World War. 
The very use of the tests indicates a willingness to sort young men on the 
basis of probability rather than on an individualized judgment of the character, 
intelligence, and prospects of each individual.  In 1930, John Henry Wigmore 
wrote in the Illinois Law Review a short editorial about what he called the 
science of “juristic psychopoyemetrology,” or “the science of measuring 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. A.G. Gulliver, The Use of a Legal Aptitude Test in the Selection of Law School Students, 
9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 560, 560 (1940). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Ferson, supra note 3, at 564. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Richard Wellington Husband, Prediction of Law School Success, 1939 WIS. L. REV. 285, 
291 (1939). 
 16. Id. at 286 n.3. 
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capacity for mental achievement.”17  Wigmore believed that the cultivation of 
his newly-named science was a good thing.  “Vocationally,” he wrote, “who 
can undervalue the immense saving of misguided effort that would be gained 
if, at the outset of preparation for a career, dependable advice could positively 
disparage one’s choice?”18  Wigmore decided to put the Stoddard-Ferson test 
to the test, and had it administered to the class that entered Northwestern in 
October 1925.19  Because the course of study was three years for those with a 
college degree and four years for those with three years of college study, the 
results were not tabulated until July 1929.20  Wigmore found a novel, and 
probably unique, way to analyze the results.  Rather than using statistics and 
especially correlation coefficients, he created charts, showing graphically 
where those who placed in the four quartiles of the aptitude scores placed in 
their law school work, measured both by the number of A’s and the number of 
A’s and B’s they received.21  Wigmore believed that his charts showed the test 
to be gravely deficient.22  Individuals from all four quartiles of the aptitude 
scores found themselves in the top quarter of the class.23  The professor 
concluded, therefore, that the Stoddard-Ferson test was of little use in 
predicting any one individual’s capacity for success in legal study, at least at 
Northwestern.24 
Not surprisingly, Wigmore’s article drew responses from advocates of 
testing.  Both Albert Crawford of the Yale Department of Personnel Study 
(which created the Yale test) and George D. Stoddard, co-author of the test 
Wigmore used, emphasized the need to make admission decisions based on 
probabilities.  As Stoddard stated: “There is only one way in which Professor 
Wigmore’s fervent hopes for adequate prognostication for the individual can 
be realized.  That is by fixing to the individual student of known 
accomplishment, say on a test, a figure representing the probability of success 
for that category of students in which he is reliably placed.”25  The advocates 
of testing, of course, promoted the tests as merely one factor in the admissions 
decision.  Nevertheless, the small controversy occasioned by Wigmore’s 
criticism indicates the growing power of the idea of large-scale sorting based 
on standardized testing.  The experience with similar tests during the first 
 
 17. John H. Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology—Or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy 
Has the Makings of a Lawyer, 24 ILL. L. REV. 454, 455 (1929). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 456. 
 20. Id. at 456-57. 
 21. Id. at 457. 
 22. Wigmore, supra note 17, at 463. 
 23. Id. at 461. 
 24. Id. at 463. 
 25. George D. Stoddard, Correspondence, Legal Aptitude Tests, 25 ILL. L. REV. 446, 447 
(1931). 
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World War surely contributed to the acceptance of the probabilistic or 
statistical idea.  As John Carson has written, the aptitude tests used by the 
Army marked “a significant break with civilian intelligence-measuring 
instruments.”26  Besides the modifications necessary for mass administration 
and grading, more unusual “was the orientation of the test toward the 
production of qualified results completely objectively determined.”27  In 
Carson’s view, the creation of the Army tests “completed a process—already 
begun, to be sure, within civilian psychology—of remaking mental testing into 
a new sort of endeavor, one in which professional judgment was subordinated 
to objective determination and statistical manipulation.”28 
There are many ways to look at the transformation Carson describes when 
trying to place it in the context of admission to law school, setting aside for the 
time being any question of what the tests “really” measured or of their formal 
statistical validity.  On the one hand, Wigmore’s objections speak to a world in 
which such decisions are made by measuring each applicant individually.  The 
use of tests does not necessarily mean the complete abandonment of such 
measures.  As Dean Gulliver reported, applicants to Yale first submitted to a 
preliminary screen based on a written application, the college record, and 
recommendations, and only then were invited to take the aptitude test and 
submit to an interview.29  The relative weight given the “objective” measure of 
the test and the subjective impression of the interview is difficult to recapture, 
but there must have been wide latitude for interviewers to indulge their 
preconceptions, prejudices, intuitions, and guesses.  The use of such factors, of 
course, not only allow one to identify those who do not test well or whose 
college efforts were handicapped by the need to work, but also allow the 
indulgence of invidious discrimination.  Dean Henry Witham of Tennessee, in 
fact, used the results of the Stoddard-Ferson test in conjunction with his 
judgment of the student’s willingness to apply himself to law school work.30  
One can only imagine what factors, beyond those he openly discussed, went 
into that determination.  On the other hand, if one believes in the relative 
validity of the test results, then their widespread use in the admissions decision 
can be seen as a net gain for fairness.  To the extent that the role of individual 
prejudice is reduced, possibilities are assumed to be opened to more and more 
people.  In this story, these possibilities even eventually would be extended to 
women. 
 
 26. John Carson, Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the Search for Army Intelligence, 84 ISIS 
278, 286-87 (1993).  The unreliable and biased nature and the misuse of the results of the Army 
tests are fully examined in STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 192-233 (1981). 
 27. Carson, supra note 26, at 287. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Gulliver, supra note 11, at 560. 
 30. Witham, supra note 7, at 450. 
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In the pre-war period, however, aptitude testing of applicants for law 
school was seen as a device for weeding out those who would not be able to 
successfully complete the course of study.  The goal was not identifying the 
best and the brightest to whom the bountiful opportunities of a legal career 
would be opened, but rather to be able to tell the least talented that attendance 
at law school would be a waste of time and money.  Testing was not so much a 
means of selecting future lawyers as it was a means of discouraging the 
manifestly incapable from applying to law school and of increasing the 
“efficiency” of legal education.  While it might be difficult to rigorously 
document, one of the stories told most often about law school admissions 
before the LSAT (and perhaps for sometime after its creation) is the 
admonishment given to first year students on their first day of class to look to 
their right and left and realize that one of the three will not make it past the 
first year.31  How widespread the policy of admitting a large number of 
students and dismissing a significant proportion after the first year of study 
cannot be known with precision, but it could not be efficient and would 
certainly encourage a culture of competition and extreme individualism in 
first-year classes.  Testing before admission was an alternative. 
III.  LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 
A. Pre-War Admissions 
Given the often-stated uses of testing, it seems that the gate to the legal 
profession was guarded not by admissions testing but by more subtle social 
pressures and attitudes that told young men—and certainly all but a very few 
young women—that certain goals were simply beyond their reach.  Any 
attempt to understand the existence of invidious discrimination in law school 
admissions before the creation of the LSAT must begin with the fact that 
American law schools were not as homogenous in the first half of the twentieth 
century as they became at its end, and that a college degree was not a 
prerequisite to a legal education and admission to the bar until after the Second 
World War.32  Although some members of the profession, both practitioners 
 
 31. In 1925, Merton Ferson, author of one pre-LSAT admissions test wrote: “The student 
mortality continues high in law school, and it is not the indolent alone who fail.”  Ferson, supra 
note 3, at 563. 
 32. Any study of the heterogeneity of American legal education in the pre-LSAT period 
must begin with two reports of the Carnegie Foundation, both authored by Alfred Z. Reed: 
Training for the Public Profession of the Law, published in 1921, and Present-Day Law Schools 
in the United States and Canada, published in 1928.  A college degree followed by three years of 
full-time study, the accepted standard today, was the sole method of obtaining a degree at only 
three schools during the 1927–1928 academic year, and curricula varied widely.  See ALFRED 
ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 169, 
222-36 (1928).  In the earlier study, Reed identified “four broadly distinguished types of law 
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and academics, did everything they could to eliminate part-time legal 
education (usually in night schools) and make a college degree a necessary 
credential for every lawyer, they did not succeed.33  Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s, the professionalizing and standard-raising ideology of some lawyers 
was met and to a great degree countered by the idea that becoming a lawyer 
was a peculiarly American way to advance in the world and become 
successful.  Ritual invocations of the privations endured by Abraham Lincoln 
in his quest for education outside of formal institutions actually seemed to 
express a powerful belief that simply would not be denied. 
Equally important to understanding the pre-LSAT world of admission to 
law school is an attempt to recapture the contours of discrimination and social 
stratification in the pre-war period.  Specifically, the extent and virulence of 
discrimination against Catholics and Jews, whether or not they or their parents 
were actually immigrants, played an important role in shaping American life in 
the period before the second World War.34  Prohibition, of course, has long 
been recognized as an attack on the culture of European immigrants and their 
descendants who were not of Anglo-Saxon stock.35  The collapse of much of 
the power of these exclusionary sentiments—at least in the major urban areas 
of the United States—in the wake of the New Deal and the war, is only 
beginning to receive attention.36  In short, admissions testing before the war 
was not needed to exclude cultural minorities.  Discrimination against them 
was acceptable and quite frankly practiced.37 
With the end of the second World War, American society found itself on 
the threshold of a new world.  Returning veterans were promised educational 
benefits, which would mean that young men who had never imagined gaining a 
 
schools” based on the length of the course of study, entrance requirements, and whether students 
were considered part-time or full-time.  ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC 
PROFESSION OF THE LAW 414-16 (1921). 
 33. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION 162-64 (1994). 
 34. For a useful summary of some of the literature and of the various schools of 
interpretation of the immigrant experience of “Americanization,” see Gary Gerstle, Liberty, 
Coercion, and the Making of Americans, 84 J. AM. HIST. 524 (1997). 
 35. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN 
NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 41, 384-85 nn.51-52 (2001). 
 36. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century 
Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1995). 
 37. Educational institutions were not exempt from these attitudes.  In discussing Goldstein v. 
Mills, 57 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (suit challenging the tax exemption of Columbia 
University on the grounds that the New York City Tax Commission had not found that Columbia 
did not discriminate in admissions as mandated by statute, and ultimately dismissed on procedural 
grounds), William E. Nelson writes: “Everyone knew, of course, that Columbia, like most other 
colleges and universities, did discriminate, especially against Jews and occasional other groups 
such as Italian Catholics.”  NELSON, supra note 35, at 152. 
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college education now had the financial ability to do so.38  They also might 
have found the imagining somewhat easier.  As the war continued and the need 
for trained enlisted men and officers increased, many young working-class 
white men not only received training in technical specialties, but also had the 
opportunity to become officers.  Having had the experience of being leaders, 
they might have found it easier to believe that higher education was not beyond 
their abilities.  For whatever reason, white male veterans returned from the war 
with new possibilities for making their place in American society.  A 
significant transformation of American society was beginning.  The story of 
the beginnings of the LSAT is an important part of the story of the birth of a 
new age. 
B. The Development of an Admissions Test 
As the second World War came to an end, higher education in the United 
States faced the challenge of accommodating the returning veterans whose 
ability to attend college and university had been greatly enhanced by the G.I. 
Bill’s educational provisions.39  It is not clear whether the potential influx of 
students made law schools more conscious of their admission procedures, but 
given the attention to testing in the pre-war period, it is not surprising to find a 
letter dated May 17, 1945 from Frank H. Bowles, admissions director at 
Columbia Law School, to the then-president of the College Entrance 
Examination Board (CEEB or College Board), John Stalnaker.  Bowles 
suggested that the two men discuss the creation of “a law capacity test” to use 
in admissions decisions.40  The current test used by Columbia, in Bowles’s 
judgment, was unsatisfactory.41  He set out seven criteria for the new 
instrument: (1) “[h]igh predictive value,” defined as a correlation coefficient of 
.70 or higher; (2) “discrete measure of capacity for law study insofar as that 
capacity can be isolated;” (3) “[h]igh reliability;” (4) no more than one and 
one-half hours in length; (5) “[s]ensible and observable relation to the study of 
law;” (6) “[r]esults easy to interpret,” and (7) low cost.42  The reply came from 
the new head of the CEEB, Henry Chauncey.  The project was of interest to the 
CEEB, but Chauncey cautioned Bowles that some of his aims might have to be 
 
 38. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND 
WAR 257-59 (1995). 
 39. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 287. 
 40. Letter from Frank H. Bowles, Admissions Director, Columbia Law School, to John 
Stalnaker, President, College Entrance Examination Board (May 17, 1945), microformed on 
Educational Testing Service Archives Microfiche (on file with the LSAC) [hereinafter ETS 
Archives] at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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sacrificed to achieve others.43  Bowles’s aims were not different from those of 
the pre-war advocates of testing.  All except Wigmore wanted something easy 
to administer, tried to tie the substance of the test to the actual study of law, 
and talked in terms of correlation in the realm of .50–.70 as acceptable and 
more than .70 as very reassuring.44 
For whatever reason, matters appear to have gone nowhere until the 
summer of 1947, when representatives from Columbia met with 
representatives of the testing organization.45  Present at that meeting, along 
with Bowles, was Professor Willis Reese of Columbia, who would play the 
leading role in the development of the LSAT.46  William Turnbull’s 
memorandum of the meeting, headed “Meeting with Columbia Representatives 
re Law Aptitude Examination,” was dated July 30, 1947.47  In his view, the 
primary purpose of the meeting was to familiarize Reese with the CEEB.48  
Bowles, whom Turnbull described as “apparently the person who has pushed 
to have the Board take over the problem” of improving Columbia’s 
procedures, wished to invite Harvard and Yale to join the project to design a 
test, the results of which would correlate with first-year grades, “on the 
assumption that first-year performance is highly correlated with later success 
in law school and in legal practice.”49  Correlation with success in taking the 
bar examination was rejected because candidates take them several times and 
“virtually everybody passes them sooner or later.”50  In addition, there was 
preliminary discussion of the contents of the test, and “paragraph reading, 
analogies, syllogistic reasoning, ‘inconsistencies,’ and practical judgment” 
 
 43. Letter from Henry Chauncey, President, College Entrance Examination Board, to Frank 
H. Bowles, Admissions Director, Columbia Law School (May 22, 1945), microformed on ETS 
Archives, supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1. 
 44. See Crawford & Gorham, supra note 4, at 1241-42, 1241 n.6; Husband, supra note 15, at 
290. 
 45. See Memorandum from William W. Turnbull, College Entrance Examination Board, 
Meeting with Columbia Representatives Re Law Aptitude Examination (July 30, 1947), 
microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 3, Box 8, Folder 1 [hereinafter 
Memorandum from William W. Turnbull]. 
 46. See id.  At the time Reese interested himself in the creation of a law school admissions 
test, Columbia University was still led by Nicholas Murray Butler who had imposed ceilings on 
the number of Jewish students at Columbia and whose administration had tried to impose ceilings 
on the dental school by merging it with the medical school, which did have admissions ceilings.  
NELSON, supra note 35, at 152.  There is no evidence that this author has been able to find, but it 
is possible, and certainly pleasing to contemplate, that Reese was trying to find a way to stymie 
Butler and his supporters by creating an objective test of ability, which, at the very least, would 
make it embarrassing to turn away clearly qualified applicants because they were members of 
groups to which unpleasant characteristics were ascribed. 
 47. Memorandum from William W. Turnbull, supra note 45. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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were all mentioned.51  Finally, Bowles suggested that the project be financed 
by contributions of three or four thousand dollars per year from each of the 
three schools.52 
All the important themes in the story of the creation of the LSAT are 
evident in this report of the first substantive meeting between the testing 
professionals and the legal educators.  First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
validity of the LSAT was linked to its correlation with grades in the first year 
of law study.  A similar correlation was used to measure the usefulness of the 
pre-war tests, and the dismissal of the criterion of success on the bar 
examination was even more telling.  As the modern American law school 
solidified its position in the profession and extended, and to some degree 
realized, its claim to being the best possible preparation for the practice of law, 
its relationship to the bar examination became more and more problematic.  
Except for those few schools that retained the “diploma privilege,” which 
allowed their graduates to automatically become members of the bar, law 
schools and the bar examination authorities were forced into an often 
uncomfortable relationship.53  The student with a law degree, the product of a 
legal education, had to pass yet another hurdle, one over which the school had 
no control.  Langdell himself had tried to separate graduation from admission, 
emphasizing the differences between an examination in a course, set by a 
teacher who had taught a specific approach to a subject, and a bar examination, 
the content of which is determined by other criteria.54  At the very beginning, 
then, the LSAT was linked to success in law school, not success at the bar.  Of 
course, the use of first-year grades as the measure of validity was a practical 
decision.  Access to those grades was completely within the schools’ control, 
and the use of first-year grades would allow the first validity studies to be 
made quickly. 
The content of the test was also set at that first meeting.  The items 
described in Turnbull’s memorandum were familiar: “paragraph reading, 
analogies, syllogistic reasoning, ‘inconsistencies,’ and practical judgment.”55  
It was not surprising, of course, that the test would look like other aptitude 
tests, especially if it was to be administered for the first time in a matter of 
months.  Chauncey wrote to an assistant dean at New York University later 
that fall: “The first test which will be tried out will contain materials from our 
files that seem a priori to be appropriate.  Later we will prepare, with the help 
of representatives from the law schools, materials that are tailor-made for this 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Memorandum from William W. Turnbull, supra note 45. 
 53. For a thorough discussion of the diploma privilege and its extent in the late 1920s, see 
REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, supra note 32, at 53-
72. 
 54. LAPIANA, supra note 33, at 56-57. 
 55. Memorandum from William W. Turnbull, supra note 45. 
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purpose.”56  In fact, the composition of the test was the least of the problems to 
be faced and solved in the short time before the first administration.  Spreading 
the word of the new project and finding law schools willing to participate were 
more important.  Increased participation would provide greater numbers for 
testing validity and spread more widely the costs. 
On August 15, 1947, representatives of Columbia, Yale, and Harvard law 
schools met with Chauncey and other representatives of the College Board to 
discuss the new test.57  On August 18, 1947, Reese reported to his dean on the 
meeting.  Columbia and Yale were reported to be very willing to go along with 
the plan, while the Harvard representative cautioned that he was less sure his 
faculty would be willing to participate, given their seeming satisfaction “with 
their present procedure and results.”58 Chauncey then outlined the College 
Board’s plan, which included a policy committee of law school representatives 
(Policy Committee) to advise the College Board on the construction of the test, 
the administration of an experimental test in the fall of 1947 preparatory to a 
March 1948 administration for use in admissions to the fall 1948 class, the 
testing of all candidates rather than just those “whose college grades placed 
[them] in the ‘doubtful category,’” and an estimate of costs between $10,000 
and $15,000 per year.59 
It seems that the only real objection raised with respect to Chauncey’s plan 
concerned the cost of development of the test.  Chauncey had suggested that 
each school contribute $4,000 per year for three years with a like amount 
contributed by the College Board.60  He further proposed that other “co-
operating” law schools interested in taking part in the development of the test 
share in the cost.61  The decision was made to write to all the members of the 
College Board that had law schools, as well as to the University of Michigan, 
and invite them to join with Harvard, Yale, and Columbia in planning and 
 
 56. Letter from Henry Chauncey, President, College Entrance Examination Board, to Russell 
D. Niles, New York University Law School (Oct. 10, 1947), microformed on ETS Archives, 
supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1 [hereinafter Letter from Henry Chauncey]. 
 57. See Letter from William W. Turnbull, College Entrance Examination Board, to Edward 
S. Noyes, Board of Admissions, Yale Law School (Aug. 18, 1947), microformed on ETS 
Archives, supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1 [hereinafter Letter from William W. 
Turnbull]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Memorandum from Henry Chauncey, President, College Entrance Examination 
Board, Proposal for Development of Legal Aptitude Test (Aug. 18, 1947), microformed on ETS 
Archives, supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1 [hereinafter Memorandum from Henry 
Chauncey]; Memorandum from Henry Chauncey, President, College Entrance Examination 
Board, Conference with Dean Griswold and Professor Dodd on the Legal Aptitude Test October 
20, 1947 (Oct. 21, 1947), microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, 
Folder 1. 
 60. See Memorandum from Henry Chauncey, supra note 59. 
 61. Id. 
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financing the test.62  Reese’s narrative is carefully couched in the passive 
voice, making it impossible to know who first suggested seeking more 
participants.63  It was a most important decision, however, because it helped 
ensure that the creation of the test would also create a new organization of law 
schools. 
The next few months were spent seeking support for the project.  In 
August, a form letter went to the deans of the law schools whose universities 
were members of the College Board, along with the dean of the University of 
Michigan’s law school.64  The letter invited the school to serve on the Policy 
Committee for the test, contribute to the cost of the test, and give one-quarter 
of a faculty member’s time to work on test development.65  An accompanying 
memorandum dated August 18, 1947, outlined what had been decided at the 
August 15, 1947, meeting, including the creation of the Policy Committee, 
testing of validity by comparison with law school grades, and financing 
arrangements.66  The participating schools would provide $12,000, while the 
College Board pledged $4,000 and promised to repay the schools when the test 
became self-supporting.67  After that, excess receipts would go into a reserve 
fund to cover future losses and perhaps pay for special research projects.68  The 
CEEB would charge the test account all direct costs, a portion of overhead, and 
a seven and one-half percent override “to be used for basic research in the field 
of testing.”69  Chauncey also held out the promise that the test might help to 
study the relationship between success in law school and in later life.70 
The replies were favorable, though no dean was willing to donate a portion 
of a faculty member’s time to the project.71  Even if a particular school did not 
use a test (though many did) or, like New York University’s school, was “as 
 
 62. See Letter from William W. Turnbull, supra note 57. 
 63. Emerson Spies believed “that that was sort of a private decision made by Willis Reese,” 
and Lawrence Tepler remembered that “in the beginning it didn’t seem to me that there was 
anything political.”  Oral History Transcript of Emerson Spies, in EDUCATIONAL TESTING 
SERVICE ORAL HISTORY PROJECT (on file with the LSAC) [hereinafter ORAL HISTORY 
PROJECT].  William Turnbull of the College Board described the decision to use the College 
Board’s membership as a mailing list as “a logical compromise between the hundred or so 
accredited law schools in the country and the three prime movers.”  Letter from William W. 
Turnbull, supra note 57. 
 64. Letter from William W. Turnbull, supra note 57. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Memorandum from Henry Chauncey, supra note 59. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Letter from Russell D. Niles, New York University Law School, to Henry Chauncey, 
President, College Entrance Examination Board (Oct. 6, 1947), microformed on ETS Archives, 
supra note 40, at Series 1, Box 1, Folder 1. 
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yet unconvinced about the usefulness of an aptitude test as a method of 
selecting law students,” they had “an open mind” and were quite willing to 
participate in what most described as an experiment.72  Monetary support 
would be forthcoming, too, although several schools first had to seek approval 
of the central university administration.73 
On October 20, 1947, Chauncey had what was probably the most crucial 
meeting in the quest to create support for a law school admissions test.  He 
traveled to Cambridge for an audience with Erwin Griswold, dean of the 
Harvard Law School.74  Griswold told Chauncey that Harvard certainly could 
use such a test to make decisions on “those borderline on college record and 
those from unknown colleges.”75  Harvard, as Tepler described many years 
later, had “a very complex system for the evaluation of college grades, and . . . 
had built up a lot of tables predicting what a certain average at a particular 
college meant.”76  The dean told Chauncey that those tables were based on the 
classes of 1928–1934 and were hopelessly “out of date,” and that no new data 
could be expected until approximately 1954.77  Tepler described the problem 
as “the return of the veterans and the flood of candidates from many places and 
many colleges” for which no data existed; “there wasn’t any reasonable way to 
work the old system anymore.”78  The test would be of real benefit to the 
school and Griswold promised cooperation.79 
Before meeting with Griswold, Chauncey had sent a letter to the dean of 
the law schools at Rutgers, Northwestern, Syracuse, Stanford, Cornell, the 
University of Southern California, New York University, the University of 
Pennsylvania, Yale, and Harvard that invited them to a meeting in Princeton to 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Conference with Dean Griswold and Professor Dodd on the Legal Aptitude Test October 
20, 1947, supra note 59. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Oral History Transcript of Lawrence Tepler, in ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 63. 
 77. Memorandum from Henry Chauncey, supra note 59. 
 78. Oral History Transcript of Lawrence Tepler, supra note 76. 
 79. For details of Chauncey’s meeting with Griswold, see Conference with Dean Griswold 
and Professor Dodd on the Legal Aptitude Test October 20, 1947, supra note 59, and Oral 
History Transcripts of Emerson Spies, Lawrence Tepler, and John A. Winterbottom, in ORAL 
HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 63.  Willis Reese had similar memories of the situation at the end 
of the war.  He told Millard Ruud, who interviewed him for the LSAC oral history project, that 
“[t]here was increased demand from the veterans returning from World War II.  So there were 
applications from a lot of individuals that we found it more difficult to evaluate.” Oral History 
Transcript of Willis Reese, in ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 63.  At the time Ruud 
interviewed Reese, Reese was terminally ill.  Even the transcript gives the impression that talking 
was an effort and the brevity and general nature of most of the conversation was no doubt because 
of Reese’s physical condition. 
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discuss the proposed test.80  If the LSAT has a birthday, it is the date of that 
meeting, November 10, 1947.81  In attendance were Chauncey, Director of the 
College Board,82 his assistant director, Richard H. Sullivan, William Turnbull 
of the College Board, Dean Elwood H. Hettrick of Boston University, Willis 
Reese from Columbia, Livingston Hall from Harvard, Albert Newmann from 
Michigan, Francis Putnam from New York University, George Braden from 
Yale, Willard Pedrick from Northwestern, Dean George Harris from Rutgers, 
the Dean of Syracuse’s law school, Paul Andrews, and two College Board 
research associates, Harold Guilksne and John French.83  From this meeting 
came several decisions about the test that would shape it for the next fifty 
years. 
C. The LSAT 
First was the name.  Although the exact title “Law School Admission Test” 
was decided on administratively after the meeting, it was Willard Pedrick who 
suggested that the schools should avoid using the term “aptitude test.”84  
Decades later he recalled: 
My thought at the time was that we didn’t want the people to think we were 
grading their aptitude, that we were grading their suitability for law school 
study, and apparently I felt then, I guess I would still feel today, that it’s better 
to tell somebody that his/her qualities, however great they may be, are not 
well-tailored to law school.85 
Pedrick’s suggestion was not unproblematic.  The test would henceforth be 
advertised as an “admissions” test—a test designed to predict the likelihood of 
success in law studies.  On the other hand, the test would have some qualities 
of an aptitude test as well.  The discussion at the November meeting brought 
out the ambiguity. 
The law professors were presented with some sample questions that 
Braden, Reese, and Lon Fuller had helped to select after the August meeting in 
New York.86  From the contemporary record of the meeting, it appears that the 
questions presented to the group involved memory and comprehension, word 
 
 80. Transcript of Conference of Law Schools on Legal Aptitude Test 1 (Nov. 10, 1947), 
microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 3, Box 8, Folder 1 [hereinafter Transcript 
of Conference]. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Chauncey would soon become the head of the ETS to be formed on January 1, 1948 by 
the merger of the College Board with the testing functions of the Carnegie Foundation and the 
American Council Testing Organization.  See Transcript of Conference, supra note 80, at 1. 
 83. See Brief of the Conference on Legal Aptitude Tests 1 (Nov. 10, 1947), microformed on 
ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 3, Box 8, Folder 1. 
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. Oral History Transcript of Willard Pedrick, in ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 63. 
 86. Transcript of Conference, supra note 80, at 7. 
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meanings, and sentence completion.  The emphasis in the first group of 
questions was on memory; Chauncey indicated that the assumption was that 
memory was important in legal work, an assumption Dean Harris of Rutgers 
confirmed.87  Dean Andrews then described the next group of questions as a 
vocabulary test.88  Dr. Turnbull attempted to explain the rationale behind these 
particular questions: “The idea is to pick out the meaning and then select a 
word from a number which have been given different meanings. . . .  It is a 
logical process rather than a vocabulary process.”89  Andrews was also 
concerned that one question required knowledge of Greek philosophy.90  
Again, Turnbull demurred, pointing out that the question required the 
candidate to complete a sentence based on information given by the question.91 
More interesting, and revealing perhaps, is the discussion of what did not 
appear among the proposed question types.  Dean Andrews weighed in with 
the suggestion that the test include some sort of examination of knowledge of 
“general culture.”92  In his view, “[t]he general cultural note strikes me as very 
important to determine whether [the candidate] will be a good lawyer or a 
licensed legal mechanic.”93  Professors Braden and Reese disagreed.  Braden 
went so far as to assert that a candidate is “eligible from a cultural point of 
view if you have a college degree and a good college record plus a legal 
aptitude test.”94  He emphasized that, while Yale does take “men in the social 
sciences,” the admissions process takes into account both the college record 
and Yale’s aptitude test, but that an applicant from an “unknown” college 
needs a better score.95  Andrews then remarked that he had denied admission to 
a candidate with an A average from “a college of applied science which is 
recognized as a good engineering education” because the applicant had taken 
only one English and one elementary history course and did “a fair job” on the 
verbal section of the test Syracuse used.96  Livingston Hall of Harvard then 
added, “I don’t think I have ever seen a record that went that far,” presumably 
in its omission of “cultural study.”97  Reese noted that, when faced with a 
candidate offering a record like the one Andrews described, Columbia had 
denied admission.98 
 
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Transcript of Conference, supra note 80, at 10. 
 92. Id. at 12. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Transcript of Conference, supra note 80, at 13. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
970 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:955 
This colloquy on “general culture” would not end the discussion by any 
means.  During the next several years, the LSAT would experiment with 
questions designed to test general knowledge before abandoning the whole 
enterprise.  At this formative moment, however, it might have been significant 
that the advocate of testing for “general culture” was the dean of a local school 
in upstate New York and opposition to the idea was expressed at once by the 
representatives of Yale and Columbia.  Although all seemed to agree that they 
had turned down applicants lacking a background in literature and history, the 
representatives of the national schools saw no need to include questions testing 
that knowledge as part of the new admissions test.  These different views of 
what the test should include might have reflected the applicant pools of the 
schools.  Perhaps Dean Andrews found himself attempting to judge among 
applicants whose cultural bona fides were less obvious than those of the 
applicants to the Ivy League schools.  For him, the test would be more useful if 
it helped to discriminate on a “cultural” basis.  The national schools, with 
applicant pools representing the best graduates of a number of colleges from 
throughout the nation, had no need for a cultural filter.  Even more 
importantly, the discussion was about excluding those whose education was 
too technical and too rooted in the sciences.  If we accept that the legal 
academics discussing the question meant what they said, they were not talking 
about excluding cultural minorities through the use of a test of general, cultural 
knowledge.  William (Ben) Schrader, an Educational Testing Service (ETS) 
specialist in testing and statistics, remembered the view of the “law school 
group”: “As long as you went through college, you would be on an equal 
footing with anybody else.”99  Because the G.I. Bill certainly made college 
more accessible to white male veterans, the decision to limit the test to aptitude 
and avoid testing specific knowledge might actually diminish cultural bias, at 
least toward some white males who might otherwise be stigmatized as 
working-class ethnics.  The issue would be revisited, however, within the first 
decade of the LSAT’s existence. 
The next topic to lead to extensive discussion is perhaps the most 
surprising to those who have grown up in a world in which the LSAT is taken 
for granted.  The original proposal from the testing professionals did not 
include reporting of the test scores to the candidates.100  Richard H. Sullivan’s 
memorandum of November 7, 1947 entitled “Legal Aptitude Test: Plan of 
Administration” suggested that candidates be told “that the scores are 
considered confidential and will be sent only to the law schools as requested by 
the candidate.  No score reports will be issued to candidates themselves, to 
 
 99. Oral History Transcript of William B. Schrader, in ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 
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 100. See Memorandum from Richard H. Sullivan, Legal Aptitude Test Plan of Administration 
(Nov. 7, 1947), microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 3, Box 8, Folder 1. 
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their families, or friends.”101  The temptation to indulge in counterfactual 
history raised by this proposal is irresistible.  Were scores reported only to 
schools, the admissions process would have been much more mysterious than 
it has turned out to be.  Unable to factor their scores into strategic decisions 
about an application strategy, students with good college records might have 
applied more adventurously and aimed higher.  Schools might have found it 
easier to keep from the public the weight given to factors other than scores and 
grades, and the entire notion of and debate about affirmative action would have 
been different.  If the scores were withheld from the candidates, the schools 
might have found it possible to withhold information about the scores of 
candidates they did accept, and the entire modern ranking system might never 
have developed.  The question of taking the test more than once would never 
have arisen.  On the other hand, the less information candidates have, the less 
accountable are the decision-makers. 
For the moment, the important datum is that the law professors gathered in 
Princeton in November 1947 unanimously voted to report scores to the 
candidates.102  The discussion leading to that decision was marked by two 
important factors.  First, several participants disagreed about how anxious 
candidates were to see their scores, and, second, there was an undercurrent of 
indifference to the ultimate solution of the question.  Henry Chauncey was 
clearly in favor of disclosure as a means to keep the admissions officers 
honest.103  In his view, college admissions officers “wanted to be able to hide 
behind scores, they want to be able to discriminate and use the scores as an 
excuse and they do not want to show their hands.”104  The law professors 
acknowledged that, in Reese’s words, the score was a “weapon” in the hands 
of a rejected candidate, yet he believed that “people are not very inquisitive as 
to what they get on their tests.”105  Braden disagreed.  Applicants to Yale want 
to know their score on the Yale test—”[t]hey want to know if they have legal 
aptitude.”106  He believed that candidates should receive their scores, or at least 
enough information to allow them to make a decision about applying to 
another law school.  The discussion ended with agreement on giving the scores 
to the candidates, but a slightly different question opened up a different line of 
discussion.107 
The schools represented at the November meeting were literally paying for 
the creation and administration of the new test.  Should other schools be 
allowed to use the scores in making admission decisions?  The decision on that 
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question—any school can ask for the scores and use them, but only those who 
contribute to the expenses of the testing program may have a hand in setting 
policy—was less important than the accompanying discussion about the 
rankings of colleges used by some of the law schools to interpret 
undergraduate grades.  Chauncey proposed the “pay to participate” solution 
and then suggested that part of the testing program involve the ranking of 
colleges.108  Livingston Hall was adamant.  He stated, “We [Harvard Law 
School] do not feel that we should make generally available to colleges the 
relative standing of other colleges as shown by our own records.”109  Braden 
and Reese admitted that only their admissions personnel understand the Yale 
and Columbia ranking systems anyway.110  The discussion ended with 
agreement that the testing professionals would consider correlating scores and 
college grades but there would be no publicity for the law schools’ ranking 
systems.111  The last subject of extended discussion was the calendar for 
administration of the test.  The discussion was dominated by attempts to 
accommodate each school’s particular admission policies.  Eventually, dates at 
the end of February and early May were selected.112 
Work continued after that November meeting.  Willard Pedrick continued 
to put forward his view that the test should not be advertised as an aptitude 
test.  In September 1947, he had written Sullivan suggesting that the 
announcement of the test be modified by striking the word “mental” from the 
phrase “to measure the mental abilities that are important” for law study.113  
Sullivan and the testing professionals eventually agreed.  He wrote to Pedrick, 
“[S]everal of us worried around with the wording descriptive of what the test is 
designed to measure and finally had to settle upon the phrase in your draft 
copy as the most appropriate.”114 
The content of the test was further discussed at a meeting at Princeton on 
January 30, 1948.  Many of the participants in the November meeting attended, 
along with a large complement of ETS personnel.115  Once again, the point was 
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made that the test was to measure the qualities important for success in law 
school rather than whatever was needed to be a successful practicing lawyer, 
and that it was to be a test of aptitude (though that word would not be used in 
public).116  According to the memorandum of the meeting in the ETS files, the 
participants agreed that the qualities for which the candidates should be tested 
fell into four categories.  First were those satisfactorily measured by the 
existing batteries of questions: precision in analysis and logical thinking, 
feeling for relevance, clarity, perception of analogy, vocabulary and verbal 
comprehension, command of language, clarity and precision in writing, ability 
to organize argument, ability to get the essence from reading matter, 
persistence and industry, concentration, executive ability, and capacity to work 
under pressure.117  Further experimentation was required to develop questions 
to test memory, rapidity of reaction, practical judgment, meticulousness, 
ingenuity, and imagination.118 
Questions might be developed to test the ability to apply principles to 
specific cases, to see the uses and possibilities of an argument, to move from 
abstract to concrete and vice versa, to recognize the adequacy of data, and 
something described as “semantic insight.”119  Finally, questions should be 
developed to test for analytical versus emotional thinking, suspicion of 
generalities, willingness to question premises, creativity and the ability to 
synthesize, ability to recreate a situation, drive to get behind premises, 
intellectual curiosity, patterns of interest, intellectual achievement, emotional 
balance, character and dependability, qualities of leadership, force, and 
drive.120 
Behind the lengthy list recorded in the memorandum is an important part 
of the story.  When asked to recall the events of 1947 and 1948 decades later, 
some of the law professors remembered that they did not have much of a role 
in deciding the content of the test.  Willard Pedrick recalled: 
[I]n those early days [the professors who attended the November 1947 
meeting] believed that somebody who is pretty good at almost any kind of 
intellectual endeavor would be a good prospect for law school.  So we started, 
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I think, with the notion that a test that had some relationship to an IQ test 
would be appropriate.121 
Constructing that test was another matter, however.  Pedrick believed that 
Reese had some input on the content of the test, but noted, “I think the rest of 
us were willing to look at ETS as the technicians and let them have a go at it 
and then come back later and see how it was working.”122  Reese himself, 
when asked whether the professors showed any interest in the technical side of 
writing the test, answered: “There was not any.”123  The same conclusion was 
drawn on the ETS side.  French noted in late 1948 that “there seemed to be 
little inclination on the part of the law professors to do any work on test 
construction.”124  For their part, the testing professionals often found the law 
professors to be less than ideal students.  John Winterbottom of ETS, who 
began a long association with the test in the mid-1950s, felt that few of the 
legal academics “really understood what was going on, and I’m not sure that 
many of them really understood validity studies and all that sort of thing we 
sent out to them.”125  Ben Schrader, also from ETS, disagreed with 
Winterbottom.126  On the other hand, Louis Toepfer found Schrader “totally 
and utterly incomprehensible,” and Emerson Spies agreed that Schrader “failed 
to understand how little we understood.”127 
The law professors might not have believed themselves competent to write 
the test they wanted, but they certainly knew what that test was supposed to do.  
From the first stirrings of interest in a “legal capacity” test, the goal was to 
create a predictive tool tied to success in law school, as defined by first-year 
grades.  That was also the goal of the pre-war admission tests, although none 
of those tests were consulted by the ETS personnel writing the first LSAT.128  
The law professors did not want to get involved in some sort of testing of 
personality, no matter how enthusiastically some ETS members lobbied for it.  
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Chauncey, in particular, believed in the ability of testing to sort American 
society both efficiently and accurately, not only for intellectual ability, but for 
personality traits as well.129  The law professors, however, would have no part 
of it, at least in the early days of the LSAT.  They were concerned only with 
one narrow measure of “success”—performance in the first year of legal study.  
As Ben Schrader remarked decades later, by the time he came to work on the 
LSAT in 1950, the idea that the test was designed only to predict first-year 
grades was “carved in stone.”130  In 1955, Winterbottom wrote a memorandum 
summarizing the policies behind the test and declared that, before the first 
administration of the LSAT in February 1948, it had been decided “that the 
main purpose of the test would be to predict scholastic achievement in law 
school.”131  And the law professors decided to accomplish that end, as 
Schrader noted, by having an aptitude test. 
Of course, the word aptitude did not appear in the name of the test, thanks 
at least in part to Willard Pedrick’s consistent advocacy.  Yet there is little 
doubt that the test was intended to be a test of capacity rather than knowledge.  
In his 1955 memorandum, Winterbottom summarized the decisions made in 
1948: 
[S]ince it seemed desirable not to do anything which would tend to limit law 
school entrants to those students having a particular kind of subject-matter 
background, it was further decided that the test should be as free as possible of 
questions based on specific information available only to those who had taken 
certain courses or who had some familiarity with the law.132 
Looking back on the contemporary record and later recollections, then, it is 
clear that the law professors involved in the creation of the LSAT in the winter 
of 1947–1948 knew what they wanted.  The professors wanted a test that could 
predict success as measured in terms of first-year grades by measuring capacity 
or aptitude rather than knowledge, but were reluctant to describe the test in 
those terms and had very little idea of how to construct a test to measure those 
qualities.133  The testing professionals at ETS did have that knowledge, and 
they put together the first LSAT from questions in the item files, according to 
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Chauncey.134  Those items were of the following types: contrary and irrelevant 
statements, debate, figure classification, paragraphs, reading comprehension, 
reasoning, sentence completion, verbal analogies, and word classification.135  
And to everyone’s great pleasure, the test worked.  The experimental tests 
given to law school students in the fall of 1947 correlated well with their 
grades.136 
After the first administrations on February 28 and May 8, 1948, it was also 
clear that the program was a financial success.  More than fifty-six hundred 
applicants took the test on those dates, generating so much revenue that ETS 
found itself holding a surplus of $23,200 attributable to the new testing 
program.137  It was clear that the contributions from the schools would be 
repaid by the end of 1948.138  More importantly, the validity studies that had 
been carried out indicated that the test was a useful predictor of success in law 
school, at least within the limits of what could be considered statistically 
significant and practically useful.139  Financially and practically successful 
then, the LSAT began its life under the best of auspices.  During the next ten 
years or so, two important lines of development played themselves out.  First, 
the debate about the content of the test called into question the meaning of the 
aptitude test.  Second, the question of the governance of the LSAT became 
more and more important as revenues increased. 
IV.  THE MEANING AND GOVERNANCE OF THE LSAT 
The LSAT was designed to be an aptitude test, but at the very beginning, 
suggestions were made that there be an effort to gauge the general culture or 
general background of the candidates.  The discussion and controversy that 
culminated in the decision in 1957 to introduce a test of general background 
took place in a world in which “cultural bias” did not mean what it would 
mean ten, let alone forty, years after the decision was made.  Both the content 
of the discussion and the way the decision was made provide an important 
perspective on the later and continuing controversy. 
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Before considering the parameters of the debate, however, it is important 
to state as strongly as possible what the LSAT was not designed to do.  The 
creators of the LSAT did not intend the test to be the sole criterion for 
admission to law school.  The entire rationale for the test was the need to 
supplement the information supplied by the undergraduate record.  The 
original understanding, Winterbottom wrote in 1955, was that “[s]cores on the 
test were to be used along with pre-law grades, recommendations and other 
information as an aid in admissions.”140  In addition, while some schools might 
have been in the position to be highly selective in admissions, Schrader 
remembered that in the “early days,” the mean score of those admitted to law 
school was not much higher than the mean score of all applicants.141  Years 
later, Emerson Spies put it simply: “There was not a great growth in those 
initial years.  That’s because there wasn’t a great need for the test in those 
early years, let’s face it.”142  A single vignette, however, says it all.  In March 
1950, a law school representative wrote A. Pemberton Johnson, 
Winterbottom’s predecessor as project manager for the LSAT, explaining, at 
his admission committee’s request, why they admitted a candidate whose 
LSAT was fifty points lower than that of the next lowest admitted candidate.  
The candidate was a college and medical graduate and “had just returned after 
a long period of war service in the Army Medical Corps” and, therefore, was 
“out of touch with the ordinary collegiate academic materials and 
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procedures.”143  He did a respectable job in his first-year studies.144  Johnson 
replied, “We firmly believe that the general findings of the validity of the 
LSAT combined with pre-law college grades are no substitute in certain 
individual cases like this for the exercise of sound judgment based on 
experience.”145  From the beginning, the LSAT was meant to be a tool, and 
from the beginning, the magic of the “objective” numerical score exercised its 
power over the legal mind. 
Questioning the LSAT’s emphasis on the measurement of aptitude did not 
take long to start.  In 1954, ETS was asked to work on questions to test 
understanding of human institutions and values, an undertaking suggested by 
the Association of American Law School’s committee on pre-legal 
education.146  The 1954 meeting of the Policy Committee voted against 
cooperation in a study of ways to measure understanding of values.  First, the 
testing of values requires a judgment about the “excellence of values reflected 
in the test materials.”147  Second, because the LSAT was an aptitude test, “[i]t 
was not evident that the proposed kind of test would be useful in this 
respect.”148 
There the matter sat until Louis Toepfer of Harvard was elected to lead the 
Policy Committee in 1956.  Years later, Toepfer candidly admitted, “I had that 
problem of everybody having high scores.”149  This led him to try to find ways 
to discriminate among those high scores.150  With Toepfer as the chair, the 
Policy Committee discussed the use of the Graduate Record Examination Area 
Tests (the Area Tests) to find the applicants with “narrow” backgrounds “who 
have majored in rather technical fields like business and who, in many cases, 
have expended their electives on trivialities.”151  The 1957 meeting of the 
Policy Committee referred the question to a subcommittee that asked ETS to 
report the scores on the Area Tests of students now in law school.152  
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Unfortunately, ETS identified only three students now in law school who had 
attended colleges where they were required to take the Area Tests and could 
find scores for only one of them.153  Thought next turned to a new one- or two-
hour test of “general culture.”  Toepfer continued to believe that the 
importance of a broad and liberal education to a lawyer made measuring what 
candidates have learned in college worthwhile.154  His colleague on the 
subcommittee, John Bainbridge from Columbia, told Toepfer that the proposed 
addition to the LSAT would give “something of substantial value to those of us 
concerned with our culture and the traditional concepts of our profession.”155 
Those attending the June 1958 meeting of the Policy Committee gave the 
matter a thorough discussion.  The minutes summarized the arguments of those 
in favor as making two points.  The new cultural material might increase the 
validity of the test and its very inclusion “would help to show that law schools 
are seriously interested in encouraging their applicants to acquire a broad 
background during their undergraduate training.”156  The opposition pointed 
out the difficulty of finding material, “particularly in the area of philosophy, on 
which there would be general agreement regarding its suitability;” that the 
material might be “coachable;” and that the addition of the material would 
diminish “the unique contribution of the LSAT” as a measure of aptitude.157  
The information on general background is available in the undergraduate 
record in any event.158  A motion to cease experimentation with testing of 
general culture was defeated and the committee voted to proceed with an 
experimental test to be administered in the fall of 1958 and validated against 
first-year grades.159 
The new test was not universally popular with those responsible for 
guiding the LSAT.  At a December 1959 meeting of the committee charged 
with furthering the development of the test, opinion on the usefulness of the 
test of general background was deeply divided.  A majority of the committee 
recommended adopting the test as part of the LSAT in November 1961, even 
though the studies carried out after the experimental administrations showed 
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that the test was useless as a predictor of law school grades.160  The majority 
position was that the new test “might be a more efficient measure of 
achievement and reveal abilities not apparent from the college record.”161  It 
also identified those who had acquired “the liberal education so strongly 
recommended by all law schools, recommended not because men so educated 
would necessarily enjoy any greater academic success but because they would 
probably become more effective members of the profession.” 162 The minority 
raised two points.  The first was the impropriety of designing a test to do 
anything other than measure legal aptitude, “the only appropriate activity of 
the Law School Admission Test Board.”163  The second was the possible effect 
on an undergraduate’s choice of courses.164 
The new test, along with questions designed to test writing ability, became 
part of an afternoon testing session in 1961.165  The first discussion of the new 
test took place at a meeting of the test development committee in February 
1963.166  Several legal educators wrote to Toepfer beforehand, presumably to 
give information they would not be present to recount in person.  At least three 
of these letters belittled the test of general background.  One correspondent 
assured Toepfer that he could learn all he needed to know about the breadth of 
education from the candidate’s transcript.  “Who cares,” William Shane wrote, 
“if he doesn’t recognize a picture of Michelangelo’s Moses?”167  Norman 
Penney told Toepfer that his school did not use the afternoon scores in the 
admissions process, except to the extent that “possibly a few students get some 
help . . . when they are on the borderline.  I doubt that any school really uses 
them more than this.”168  Yet another writer was more sympathetic to the 
general background test because they might identify those who do not do well 
on the rest of the LSAT, but who “nevertheless may do successful law school 
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work.”169  But unless the test of general background can identify those persons, 
it is not worth it.170 
The last comment was the most telling.  What impressed Winterbottom the 
most at the meeting on February 22, 1963 “was the way in which 
considerations of statistical validity dominated the discussion.”171  In his view, 
the general background test was not designed to rise or fall on its ability to 
predict grades.172  He thought it had been adopted originally for its “backwash 
effect [in influencing undergraduate study] and in order to provide information 
which may help law schools to select students for qualities which have no very 
close relationship with grades.”173  Toepfer agreed with Winterbottom’s 
assessment of the tone of the meeting, but was far from happy with it.  In his 
view, the fascination with statistical validity illustrates the “fundamental 
weakness” of the committee members.174  He complained that “[n]one of them 
know beans about admissions and apparently have closed their minds to 
learning.”175  For Toepfer, “[t]he only good way to assess a test is to examine it 
and then ask yourself whether you would rather have a man who stood high on 
this measure than one who stood low.”176 
This controversy about the test of general background is clearly important 
for understanding the development and role of the LSAT in law school 
admissions, but how we should interpret it more than forty years after the event 
is far from self-evident.  At first blush, the subject of the test is clearly 
“cultural,” an ideal means of creating and perpetuating cultural bias, and would 
be conclusive evidence for some that the LSAT’s very roots are sunk deep into 
the earth of racism and invidious discrimination.177  But the historical record 
reveals a far more complex situation.  There certainly is no evidence that 
anyone intended the general background test to exclude any particular group.  
Louis Toepfer, perhaps its strongest advocate, saw it as a way to answer his 
own peculiar problem as the person responsible for admissions to Harvard Law 
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School.  All his applicants had “high scores,” and he believed that the general 
background test would give him some basis on which to sort his own applicant 
pool.178  In fact, recalling the controversy about the general background test, 
Toepfer asserted that “the only thing” that sorted people the way the rest of the 
test did not “was really the knowledge of current events.”179 
People do have differing opportunities to acquaint themselves with current 
events and differing views about what events are sufficiently important to 
warrant attention.  Asserting that the goal of the general background test was to 
sort out candidates who were interested in the world around them does not 
absolve the test of bias in construction or result.  On the other hand, the 
opposition to and eventual abandonment of the general background test reveal 
one of the most important consequences of the use of standardized testing in 
law school admissions.  As Winterbottom noted and Toepfer lamented, by the 
early 1960s, discussion of the value of testing was firmly rooted in the belief 
that the testing was appropriate only to the degree that it could predict law 
school performance.  The most damning thing that could be said about the 
general information test was that it did not predict. 
The emphasis on prediction was not new, of course.  The pre-war 
admission tests had also been subject to validation studies based on 
correlations between test scores and performance in law school.  The LSAT, 
however, was more widely used and subjected to ongoing supervision.  Year in 
and year out, the legal educators who sat on the Policy Committee and its 
various subcommittees, especially those devoted to development of and 
research on testing, heard ETS personnel subject every suggestion for 
modification of the test to one criterion: how well did a new question-type 
predict performance?  Those outside the LSAT organization read literature that 
told them that the test was designed to predict success in law school—
specifically, first-year grades.  Beginning in 1960, conferences for admission 
personnel of law schools spread the gospel of prediction even more widely. 
V.  THE ROLE OF PREDICTION 
One meaning of the story of the general background test is that prediction 
became the rationale for objective testing.  Tests that did not aid prediction—
general background and the contemporary tests of writing ability—were 
discarded.  The emphasis on prediction had another, and perhaps unexpected, 
effect.  What the LSAT could not do became as important as what the test 
could do.  The test did say something about ability to do law school work as 
measured by first-year grades, but its very limitation helped to focus attention 
on other factors in admission decisions. 
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One of the factors investigated was “personality,” a term meaning all the 
aspects of a person that lead him or her to work hard at a task.180  By 
investigating personality, the legal educators and ETS personnel thought they 
might find a way to identify the under- and over-achiever, or, in cruder terms, 
to identify both the lazy and those who would have to struggle to keep up.  
Even though members of both groups might do well on the LSAT, they might 
not be the best risks for admission.  In the fall of 1956, experimental 
personality tests were administered at ten different law schools to about 
thirteen hundred students.181  Three different types of tests were given.  Two 
were designed to measure “flexibility” and “aspiration,” and the third was an 
“omnibus” test intended to measure a broad range of personality traits.182  The 
tests were to be evaluated against grades, and one hope was to identify those 
who might drop out, especially for reasons other than poor academic 
performance.183  The goal was to find an objective test of the qualities Henry 
Witham identified in 1930 as necessary components of success in law school.  
A memorandum prepared in preparation for the testing gives further indication 
of the sort of thinking behind the new project.  One test would involve 
sentence completion because “[t]here is good evidence to support the idea that 
variability in response to the same sentence completion stems, over several 
occasions, is a good measure of an important quality that might be called 
‘Tolerance of Ambiguity,’ ‘Tolerance of Complexity,’ or, in a particular sense, 
‘Flexibility.’”184  The results of such a test would be useful because of the 
“reputed fact” that some students fail because they cannot cope with the 
discovery that law is not certain and rigorously logical.185 
In retrospect, the assumptions behind this psychological testing might 
seem a bit naive, but the effort was a serious one.  The Policy Committee spent 
a considerable sum, more than $25,000, in the effort.186  The actual 
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implementation of the study was handed over to John R. Hills, director of the 
office of testing and guidance of the Regents of the University System of 
Georgia.  In April of 1959, he reported to Winterbottom that the entire project 
had turned up little useful information.  “Most of the leads we followed,” he 
wrote, “have petered out, as far as prediction of grades in law school goes.”187  
Winterbottom replied that no one was expecting the study to have “immediate 
application” to admissions decisions, and it was sufficient to have increased 
knowledge about personality.188  Winterbottom added, “I think that we should 
look on this study as the close of a chapter so far as the LSAT Policy 
Committee is concerned.”189 
The failure of the mid-1950s study did not, however, mark the end of 
concern with the personality of applicants.  In 1960, the LSAT Research 
Committee (Research Committee) was talking about investigating motivation 
and attitudes.190  In 1961, the entire Policy Committee heard the Research 
Committee’s report that discussed “at length” the possibility of using “such 
sensitive information as religious affiliation, family income, parent’s 
education, and the like.”191  The committee believed that gathering such 
information was not necessary because “[t]he applicant’s social and cultural 
background, it is believed, is determinative only to the extent that it produces 
certain attitudes, drives, and characteristics.”192  There should be no objection 
to using some device to measure these attitudes directly, “without regard to the 
background that produced them.”193  At that same meeting, the Policy 
Committee voted to appropriate $3,000 to hire experts to assist in the design of 
research on the role of “non-intellectual factors” in law school success.194  
Louis Toepfer summed up the goal of this research when he answered a British 
legal academic’s questions about the use of the LSAT at Harvard.  The test, he 
wrote, provided a useful common basis for comparing students of diverse 
backgrounds, and it “assists greatly in arriving at a decision about admission” 
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of candidates “whose other attainments leave us doubtful or often 
openminded.”195  Just as important, however, is what the test does not do: 
You will see when you examine this test that it measures largely qualities in 
the general area of verbal reasoning.  It does not include measures of likes and 
dislikes, ambition, motivation and other personal qualities which are closely 
related to successful performance.  For this reason, it is not very useful by 
itself but taken with undergraduate records and other appraisals it becomes a 
very helpful tool.196 
As Toepfer acknowledged, however, the test could not be the only tool.  
Indeed, the need for additional tools would almost certainly become acute.  
The legal academics and ETS personnel knew the demographic facts.  The 
“population boom” was approaching law-school age, and the number of 
applicants was likely to increase.197  One view was that the increase would put 
even greater demands on the LSAT to predict not only success, but also 
superior performance as the number of competent applicants increased and the 
competition for scholarships increased.198  At the same time, as H.B. Reese 
told the Research Committee, “many of us in admissions administration are 
using standards of selection other than success in law school.”199  The 
additional criteria might include trying to predict what sort of practitioners 
graduates would be.  “Another possible criterion might emerge,” he believed, 
“from judgments about the kind of student body we want, apart from their 
capacities.”200 
As the 1960s began and the baby boom came into the sights of law school 
admissions officers, the LSAT had contributed to the creation of a culture in 
which prediction of success in law school was an important part of the 
admission decision, but was clearly understood by those most familiar with the 
test and its development to be not the only part.  The quest continued for better 
ways to determine which candidates would have a more difficult time because 
of their “personality,” especially as expressed in motivation for study.  At the 
same time, the ability to predict that the LSAT provided made it clear that 
other factors entered into the admission decision. 
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microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at Series 3, Box 9, Folder 32; Memorandum from 
H.B. Reese, to the Research Committee (n.d.), microformed on ETS Archives, supra note 40, at 
Series 3, Box 9, Folder 22 [hereinafter Memorandum from H.B. Reese]. 
 198. Minutes of the Test Development and Research Committee Meeting, supra note 197. 
 199. Memorandum from H.B. Reese, supra note 197. 
 200. Id. 
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VI.  THE ROLE OF THE LSAT TODAY 
Somehow, in spite of the consistent message that the LSAT was merely 
one factor in law school admissions, the test score has assumed an 
overwhelming importance.  The position of the plaintiff in Grutter v. 
Bollinger201 can be understood at the most general level as expressing the idea 
that a candidate with a higher score should always be admitted in preference to 
a candidate with a lower score, although perhaps it is more accurate to say that 
the argument is that a preference based on race cannot offset a lower score.202  
The current “ratings” of law schools, which mirror the median LSAT of their 
students, are often blamed for the overemphasis on test scores and certainly 
could contribute to the idea of test score as entitlement.  When a candidate can 
see that he or she has an LSAT score above a school’s median, rejection begins 
to look suspicious. 
Not so long ago, however, it was the test score itself that was suspicious.  
The “truth-in-testing” movement of the 1970s was predicated on the belief that 
the tests were unfair and had too great an influence in the lives of those who 
had no option but to surrender their futures to a standardized test.  ETS, the 
creator of most of these tests (though not the LSAT, which was produced after 
the creation of the independent Law School Admissions Council), was seen as 
“powerful, unaccountable, and secretive.”203  The result of the movement for 
greater accountability on the part of ETS was the enactment of a “truth-in-
testing” law in New York State in 1979.204  The result for ETS was a decision 
to treat the New York statute as if it had nationwide effect and to release copies 
of all tests when they were given.205  The same provisions, of course, applied 
to the LSAC and the LSAT. 
The result for the test-preparation business was increased opportunity and 
respectability.  The release of the tests gave the review companies raw material 
with which to work and a much greater ability to claim success by measuring 
their students’ improvement by comparing “before-and-after” results on 
examinations that were the real thing.  To put it crudely, aptitude could be 
bought.206  As Nicholas Lemann notes in his study of the standardized test in 
America, the market was large and vigorous, powered by the understandable 
 
 201. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
 202. Id. at 2332-33. 
 203. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
MERITOCRACY 220 (1999). 
 204. Id. at 224-27. 
 205. Id. at 227. 
 206. The effects of “truth-in-testing” on the review business are described in LEMANN, supra 
note 203. 
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desire of baby-boom-generation parents to ensure their children’s future and 
prevent the disaster of downward mobility.207 
If the rewards of a high test score become an entitlement, then any 
interference with that entitlement will be resisted, and there seems little doubt 
that affirmative action based on race is widely seen as just such interference.  
The secretive and elitist testing agency has been replaced as an object both of 
fear and scorn by an interfering government and by secretive and elitist 
educational institutions.208  The situation is complicated, of course, by electoral 
politics and votes presumably to be gained by opposing racially-based 
affirmative action. 
The world of legal education itself has also contributed to the 
transformation of the role of the LSAT.  In the first place, the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) accreditation standards require that a law school require 
applicants to take a “valid and reliable admission test to assist the school in 
assessing the applicant’s capability of satisfactorily completing the school’s 
educational program,” and the presumption is that the LSAT is the test to 
take.209  As part of maintaining accreditation, the ABA requires law schools to 
 
 207. Id. at 228-29.  For a review of the Lemann book, see William P. LaPiana, Testing, Class, 
and Material Success, or How We Got to Be Professors, H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences (2000), at http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=1664796 
6265537 (2000) (reviewing LEMANN, supra note 203). 
 208. Lemann describes in detail an important facet of the controversy, the enactment in 
California of Proposition 209 banning affirmative action based on race.  LEMANN, supra note 
203, at 225-336. 
 209. The relevant standard and its interpretations are as follows: 
Standard 503. ADMISSION TEST. 
A law school shall require each applicant to take a valid and reliable admission test to 
assist the school in assessing the applicant’s capability of satisfactorily completing the 
school’s educational program. 
Interpretation 503-1: 
A law school that uses an admission test other than the Law School Admission Test 
sponsored by the Law School Admission Council shall establish that such other test is a 
valid and reliable test to assist the school in assessing an applicant’s capability to 
satisfactorily complete the school’s educational program 
Interpretation 503-2: 
This Standard does not prescribe the particular weight that a law school should give to an 
applicant’s admission test score in deciding whether to admit or deny admission to the 
applicant. Other relevant factors that may be taken into account include undergraduate 
course of study and grade point average, extracurricular activities, work experience, 
performance in other graduate or professional programs, relevant demonstrated skills, and 
obstacles overcome. 
Interpretation 503-3: 
A pre-admission program of coursework taught by members of the law school’s full-time 
faculty and culminating in an examination or examinations, offered to some or all 
applicants prior to a decision to admit to the J.D. program, also may be useful in assessing 
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submit an annual questionnaire, which, among much other required 
information, requires the schools to report the LSAT scores of matriculating 
students.  The scores are then reported in the ABA Law School Guide.210  
While such information is certainly valuable to an applicant who is trying to 
decide on an application strategy, there is no way to limit its use.  The LSAT 
scores of a school’s students have become important in commercial rankings, 
especially those by U.S. News and World Report.  A statistical analysis of 
those rankings commissioned by Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) found that “virtually all of the differences in the overall ranks among 
schools could be explained by the combination of two of the U.S. News factors.  
These factors are student selectivity (which is driven by the school’s median 
LSAT score) and academic reputation.”211 
The need to stand out in these rankings, of course, becomes a powerful 
impetus to report the most impressive scores possible.  The LSAC itself has 
recognized that the LSAT is subject to what it does not call, but surely can be 
described as, abuse.  In 1999, as part of a comprehensive series of 
recommendations on the proper use of test scores in admissions, the 
anonymous authors of the study noted: 
It is generally acknowledged that too few resources are dedicated to the 
increasingly complex law school admission process.  There was a time when 
the number of faculty and staff allocated to this function was adequate to the 
demand, but that was before recruiting, marketing, counseling, customer 
service, computer expertise, research, e-mail, data management, continuing 
education, and many other functions became a part of the admission operation.  
Law schools with staff that are too small, with too little power to effect change, 
may have contributed to expedient uses of standard predictors and the 
resultingly thin records of other criteria used to make decisions.212 
To some degree the law schools themselves have contributed to the 
overwhelming importance of the LSAT score, although it must be noted that 
the deans of law schools have severely criticized the commercial rankings that 
have contributed to the outsized importance of the LSAT.213 
 
the capability of an applicant to satisfactorily complete the school’s educational program, 
to be admitted to the bar, and to become a competent professional. 
American Bar Association, Standards for Legal Education, at http:www.abanet.org/legaled/ 
standards/chapter5.html (2003). 
 210. American Bar Association, 2003 Annual Questionnaire Part 2, at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/questionnaire/questionnairefiles/enrollment.doc (2003). 
 211. STEPHEN P. KLEIN & LAURA HAMILTON, THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REPORT RANKING OF ABA LAW SCHOOLS, at http://www.aals.org/validity.html (1998). 
 212. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, NEW MODELS TO ASSURE DIVERSITY, FAIRNESS, 
AND APPROPRIATE TEST USE IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 7 (1999). 
 213. Law School Admission Council, Deans Speak Out, at http://www.lsac.org/ 
LSAC.asp?url=lsac/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp (2003). 
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The prominence of the LSAT score in these despised, but clearly 
influential rankings, has helped to transform a test that was designed to provide 
guidance to applicants and, as this article argues, to increase the diversity of 
the profession by helping to show that many people had the ability to do law 
school work.  In addition, the test was never meant to have anything to do with 
any sort of prediction of whether a candidate would be a successful lawyer, 
whatever that term means.  Today, however, the LSAT—that is, the mean and 
median test scores of the student body—has become the most important factor 
distinguishing one law school from another.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The homogenization of American legal education in the period after the 
second World War eliminated the variety noted in Alfred Reed’s reports 
authored for the Carnegie Foundation.214  The three-year course of study for 
full-time students became the norm, the college degree the universal 
prerequisite, and the casebook, rather than the treatise, the basis of classroom 
instruction.  Many different factors helped to bring about change, including the 
ambitions of law school faculties, the ability of the ABA to convince state 
authorities that only graduates of ABA-approved schools would be allowed to 
sit for the bar examination, and the resulting power of the ABA accreditation 
requirements and, to a lesser degree, the requirements for AALS 
membership.215 
Reed’s studies, however, were more than descriptive.  His great insight 
was that the wide variety of legal practice in the United States meant that not 
all lawyers needed to be trained in the same way and that all law schools need 
not look alike.  He was particularly concerned that men (at least) from all 
classes be able to aspire to the bar: 
Humanitarian and political considerations unite in leading us to approve of 
efforts to widen the circle of those who are able to study law.  The organization 
of educational machinery especially designed to abolish economic handicaps—
intended to place the poor boy, so far as possible, on an equal footing with the 
rich—constitutes one of America’s fundamental ideals.  It is particularly 
important that the opportunity to exercise an essentially governmental function 
should be open to the mass of our citizens.216 
Reed was not concerned with race or with gender, but his concern for a 
representative legal profession led him to envision a system of legal education 
 
 214. REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, supra note 
32, at 169. 
 215. The story of the transformation of one law school and the important role of the ABA and 
AALS is told in DAVID J. LANGUM & HOWARD P. WALTHALL, FROM MAVERICK TO 
MAINSTREAM: CUMBERLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, 1847–1997, at 118-42, 168-226 (1997). 
 216. Reed, supra note 32, at 398. 
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that maximized diversity in the American legal profession.  The LSAT was 
created to further that aim. Whether it can continue to do so is the challenge of 
law school admissions in the Twenty-first Century. 
 
